We study the no arbitrage characterization of asset prices in the presence of capital gains and income taxes. The distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we impose on the model two important features of the tax code that have received little attention in the academic literature: the limited use of capital losses and the inability to wash sell. We show that under remarkably mild conditions, the lack of pre-tax arbitrage implies the lack of post-tax arbitrage for all investors when the limited use of capital losses is imposed. The result also holds when only a wash sale constraint is imposed and no investor holds a portfolio with a large capital loss. The results allow investors to face different tax rates and have different bases for the calculation of capital gains taxes. When the underlying assets are capital gain taxed Arrow-Debreu securities, the shadow riskless interest rate embedded in the prices must be positive to avoid post-tax arbitrage under either limited use of losses or no wash sales. When the security market also includes a taxable bond, arbitrage can exist with no wash sales for sufficiently large tax bases. Limiting the use of capital losses eliminates this arbitrage. When the price system consists of a capital gain taxed stock and a taxable bond, the pre-tax interest rate must be positive and the post-tax return of the bond cannot dominate the post-tax return of the stock to avoid post-tax arbitrage under limited capital losses. When the wash sale restriction is imposed with this price system, limited arbitrage opportunities can still arise if there exists a very large tax basis in the portfolio relative to the current stock price. We also demonstrate that allowing the full use of capital losses has strong implications for portfolio choice. When a capital loss tax rebate is disallowed, investors tend to optimally hold significantly smaller equity positions.
Introduction
In this paper, we study the no arbitrage characterization of asset prices in the presence of taxes on capital gains and income. The distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we study two important features of the tax code that have received limited attention in the academic literature: the limited use of capital losses and the inability to wash sell. With a limited use of capital losses as consistent with the U.S. tax code, a realized capital loss does not lead to a tax rebate from the government, but can only offset current or future capital gains. 1 The inability to wash sell restricts an investor from realizing a capital loss and immediately reestablishing the same security position. We show that under remarkably mild conditions, the lack of pre-tax arbitrage implies the lack of post-tax arbitrage for all investors with limited use of capital losses. The result also holds when only a wash sale constraint is imposed and no investor holds a portfolio with a large capital loss. These results allow investors to face different tax rates and have different bases for the calculation of capital gains taxes. When the traded assets are Arrow-Debreu securities only subject to capital gains taxation, the shadow riskless interest rate embedded in the prices must be positive to avoid post-tax arbitrage under either limited use of losses or no wash sales. When the security market also includes a taxable bond, a limited arbitrage exists with no wash sales for sufficiently large tax bases. Limiting the use of capital losses eliminates this arbitrage. When the traded assets consist of a stock and a bond with both capital gain and income taxes, the pre-tax interest rate must be positive and the post-tax return of the bond cannot dominate the post-tax return of the stock to avoid post-tax arbitrage under limited capital losses. When the wash sale restriction is imposed, limited arbitrage opportunities can still arise if there exists a very large tax basis in the portfolio relative to the current stock price. We also demonstrate that the use of capital losses has strong implications for portfolio choice. Investors tend to hold significantly smaller equity positions when a capital loss tax rebate is disallowed.
Determining the no arbitrage characterization of asset prices when investors face capital gain taxation with limited use of capital losses or wash sale restrictions is important for a variety of reasons. First, we need to understand what additional restrictions are needed on price systems to rule out post-tax arbitrage opportunities both in a global and a local sense. Without such restrictions, the validity of pricing by no arbitrage is called into question, impeding answering such questions as the determination of equilibrium or assessing the viability of tax-based explanations of pricing anomalies. A crucial element in eliminating local post-tax arbitrage opportunities involves the use of realized capital losses. A common assumption in the literature on portfolio choice with capital gains taxation is that investors have full use of capital losses (Constantinides (1983) ). Indeed, in the seminal work of Constantinides (1983) , the work's main contribution was in valuing the taxloss selling option induced when the full use of capital losses is allowed. However, under the current U.S. tax code, the use of losses is restricted. Second, we need to understand the implications of the tax code on portfolio choice. When these restrictions are introduced, we show they heavily influence portfolio choice in a simple example. Consequently when the full use of losses and wash sales are allowed, it is unclear if portfolio recommendations are based on risk-return tradeoffs or on the arbitrage opportunities present in the model. We now illustrate how such arbitrage opportunities arise and then illustrate how allowing such opportunities affects portfolio choice. Table 1 summarizes the post-tax payoffs of the portfolio when the investor does not trade as well as when he tax loss sells security u under two different capital loss use assumptions. By not trading, the investor will receive a post-tax payoff of $1 next period in either state. After tax loss selling at t = 0, the investor uses the proceeds to buy any additional d securities needed to guarantee the same post-tax payoff in state d as in the no trade case. All remaining sale proceeds are used to buy u securities. 2 When capital losses generate a tax rebate as seen in the row labeled "Full Use of Capital Losses," tax loss selling leads to a higher post-tax payoff in the future state u as compared to not trading. By tax loss selling today, the investor generates a "tax rebate" from the government due to the realized capital loss. This increase in today's post-tax wealth can then be invested leading to higher post-tax payoffs in the future generating an arbitrage. In the example, the investor is able to generate post-tax wealth of 1.25 as compared to 1.0 in the no trade case when state u occurs. When capital losses can only be used to offset current or future gains (the "Limited Capital Loss Use" row), the investor is indifferent between tax loss selling and not trading since by trading today, he does not lose the realized capital loss to offset future gains. Clearly with the full use of capital losses, the limited arbitrage could be eliminated by imposing a wash sale constraint.
Examples
With the constraint, the investor could realize the capital loss only by not reinvesting in the state u Arrow-Debreu security. However, imposing the wash sale constraint is not sufficient to eliminate such local post-tax arbitrages as the next example demonstrates.
Example 2: Arbitrage with a Wash Sale Constraint. Consider a single period stock and bond binomial price model. The security market consists of a tax-free bond with a total return R f = 1.05 and a stock subject to realized capital gain taxation at a rate τ = 0.2. The stock's initial price is S(0) = 1. Next period's stock price is either u = 1.2 and d = 0.8. The investor is initially endowed with 1 shares of stock with a tax basis of b = 20. The investor can generate a "tax rebate" by tax loss selling his stock position, but he is prohibited from repurchasing, or wash selling, the stock. At the end of the period, the investor's portfolio is liquidated. 
Liquidate Position Today
New Portfolio:
in a one period stock and bond binomial portfolio choice example. In this economy, the security market consists of a tax-free bond with a total return R = 1.05 and a stock subject to realized capital gain taxation at a rate τ = 0.2. The stock's initial price is S(0) = 1. Next period's stock price is 1.2 with probability 0.72 and 0.8 with probability 0.28. The investor is initially endowed with 3 shares of stock with a tax basis of b = 0.9, 1.0, or 1.1. The investor who has logarithmic preferences maximizes the expected utility of final period post-tax wealth.
Each plot graphs the investor's expected utility as a function of total equity exposure under no capital gain taxation as well as the two capital loss use assumptions from Table 1 . The x's on the plots represent the optimal portfolio choice under each scenario. The top panel assumes the investor's equity endowment has an embedded gain (b = 0.9). In the no tax benchmark, the investor optimally trades to an equity position of 3.2 shares. When capital losses can be used to generate a "tax rebate," the optimal equity position is 2.85 shares. Once the use of capital losses is limited, the optimal equity position falls to 1.90 shares. The middle panel of the figure assumes the investor's equity endowment has no embedded gain (b = 1.0). With the full use of capital losses, the optimal equity position is 2.8 shares. With the restricted use of capital losses, the optimal equity position falls even more than before to 1.05 shares. Finally, the last panel of the figure assumes the investor's equity endowment has an embedded loss (b = 1.1). Interestingly, the full loss use assumption actually generates a higher expected utility than the no tax case given that the investor can tax loss sell today to increase his wealth. In the full loss use case, the investor optimally holds 2.85 shares. When losses can only be used to offset current or future gains, the investor optimally holds 1.5 shares. By being able to carry forward the capital loss today, the investor can reduce his equity exposure and still use the capital loss to lower taxes in the future. Tax) , full loss use taxation (Full Loss Use), and losses can be carried forward (Limited Loss Use). The three panels present results for three different basis to price ratios -b = 0.9, 1.0, and 1.1. The x's represent the optimal portfolio choice under each scenario.
The three examples highlight the importance of tax rebates in both arbitrage and portfolio choice. Since most tax codes do not allow or seriously limit rebates, it is important to determine the additional restrictions on price systems to rule out post-tax arbitrage opportunities. From these restrictions, the structure of post-tax state prices that can be used to value post-tax cash flows can be studied. Indeed, a common assumption in the corporate finance literature is for all investors regardless of their current portfolio holdings to discount post-tax cash flows using a common set of state prices. We show that this "tax-neutrality" with respect to state prices is in general not true.
Post-tax state prices in the presence of realized capital gain taxation are in general dependent on current endowments and tax bases in a complex fashion.
Related Work
This work is most closely related to the no arbitrage tax analysis of Ross (1987) and Dammon and Green (1987) . In contrast to Ross (1987) where the focus is on establishing the equivalence between the existence of no local arbitrage opportunities and the existence of equivalent martingale measures under taxation, our focus is on understanding the restrictions needed on price and tax systems to rule out post-tax arbitrage opportunities. While Ross (1987) and Dammon and Green (1987) mainly study price-independent tax systems, our focus is on taxation that depends on prices with the option to defer. For a complementary analysis of a mark-to-market tax system without the possibility of deferrals, see Jensen (2002) . Our current analysis is also formulated in a setting with no trading restrictions such as a short-sale constraint. The study of redundant but differentially taxed securities as in Schaefer (1982) and Dybvig and Ross (1986) is undertaken in Section 3 of the current work, but is not our primary emphasis.
In addition to the tax arbitrage literature, our work is also related to the tax portfolio choice literature that commonly assumes that the use of realized capital losses is not restricted. Early work in the area includes Constantinides (1984) , Constantinides and Scholes (1980) , Dammon et al. (1989) , and Dammon and Spatt (1996) . For exact solutions of capital gain tax portfolio problems under short horizons see Dybvig and Koo (1996) and Hur (2001) . Numerical characterizations of richer portfolio problems are undertaken by Dammon et al. (2001b Dammon et al. ( , 2000 Dammon et al. ( , 2001a ; Garlappi et al. (2001) ; Gallmeyer et al. (2002); DeMiguel and Uppal (2003) . Also related is applied work concerned with valuing tax-sheltered assets such as Sibley (2002) and Horan (2002) .
Static Arrow-Debreu Price Systems
To easily isolate the role of limited tax loss selling or wash sale constraints on arbitrage, we present the main results in a one-period Arrow-Debreu world with a finite set of states. In this setting, all payoffs are capital gains with no investment income (dividends or interest). Extensions to dynamic economies with capital gains and income paying securities are given below.
A finite set of states exists indexed by ω = 1, . . . , m. As many securities as states exist. In state ω, security ω pays 1, while every other security pays zero. We denote payoffs from securities by the vector x: It is well known (Ross (1987) ) that there is no pre-tax arbitrage if and only if p ω > 0 for all ω.
Our analysis involves introducing features of the tax code to the economy to understand the additional restrictions needed on the price system such that in addition to being free of pre-tax arbitrage opportunities, the price system is also free of post-tax arbitrage opportunities. Much of our analysis pertains to the tax ramifications of realized capital losses. We adopt the following capital loss definitions. Note that Definition 2 is the common assumption made in the portfolio choice literature with capital gain taxes (Constantinides (1983) ; Dammon et al. (2001b Dammon et al. ( , 2000 Dammon et al. ( , 2001a ; Garlappi et al. For tractability, our definition of the limited use of capital losses does not include the ability to use capital losses to offset current taxable income. In the U.S. tax code, individual investors can offset up to $3, 000 of taxable income per year with realized capital losses. This feature of the tax code is discussed in Section 4. Additionally, our analysis does not distinguish between differential taxation of long and short-term capital gains. For such an analysis, see Dammon and Spatt (1996) .
We also study the role of constraining wash sales in determining post-tax arbitrage free prices.
A wash sale is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Wash Sale)
A wash sale is a sale and an immediate repurchase of an existing security position with an embedded capital loss to realize the loss.
In the U.S. tax code, an investor cannot deduct capital losses from a wash sale trade. Specifically, a wash sale occurs when an investor trades securities at a loss and within 30 days before or after the sale, the investor buys "substantially identical" securities.
Limited Use of Capital Losses
We start with the simplest case with no income taxation and no non-taxable securities where capital losses can only be used to offset current or future gains and wash sales are allowed. Capital losses cannot generate a tax rebate from the taxing authority. Let τ denote the capital gains tax rate for the investor. Different investors can face different tax rates. Any capital losses from previous trades are denoted L(−1) ≤ 0. Our definition of post-tax arbitrage is adapted from Ross's definition of a "local arbitrage opportunity" (Ross (1987) ).
Definition 5 A post-tax arbitrage exists if there is a trading strategy
and
for all ω with strict inequality for some ω where
Equation (1) Rearranging (2), we can define the net change in wealth for state ω due to trade as ∆W (ω)
5 can be re-written as stating
for all ω with at least one strict inequality.
Theorem 1 No pre-tax arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage for all investors if the interest rate is positive.
Proof: Substituting for x ω , we can re-write
We first show that for every state, ∆W (ω) ≥ 0 implies (y ω − z ω ) ≥ p(y − z). Substituting for −py, we get
Note that this inequality is strict if ∆W (ω) > 0.
We trivially have (
One of these inequalities must be strict if there is post-tax arbitrage, i.e. ∆W (ω) ≥ 0 for all ω and ∆W (ω) > 0 for some ω.
• If y ω − z ω = 0 and ∆W (ω) > 0, a parallel argument to the case y ω − z ω < 0 leads to the conclusion 0 > p(y − z), so we get the strict inequality (
Multiplying both sides by p ω and sum to get:
This implies that the sum of the state prices is greater than one, or that the default free bond costs more than one, or that the interest rate is negative.
If the implicit interest rate is negative, it is wealth improving for the investor to realize any embedded gains in his portfolio rather than to not trade. By imposing the limited use of losses, we require no additional restrictions on prices to guarantee every investor faces a post-tax arbitrage-free price system beyond the interest rate being positive. 
Remark 1 (Multiple Bases
for all ω with strict inequality for some ω. Now, exactly the same argument can be applied.
No Wash Sales with Full Use of Capital Losses
In this section, we analyze how a wash sale constraint influences the set of post-tax state prices when investors face no restriction on the use of capital losses. If one of the securities is sold with a capital loss and repurchased, the original sale is deemed to have not occurred. For a particular trading strategy (y, z), if p ω < b ω , then the number of state ω securities recognized as purchased or shorted by the taxing authority is y ω − max{min(y ω , z ω ), 0} and the number of state ω securities actually sold is z ω − max{min(y ω , z ω ), 0}. Note that the max operator accommodates for potential short selling by the investor. A sale of an Arrow-Debreu security with a positive capital gain is not subject to the wash sale restriction.
To accommodate for the wash sale restriction, our definition of post-tax arbitrage is modified as follows.
Definition 7 There is post-tax arbitrage if there exists a trading strategy
for all ω with strict inequality for some ω.
As in the case that restricted the use of capital losses, the first equation in the above definition guarantees that the trading strategy (y, z) is self-financing. The second equation compares the post-tax wealth in each state induced by the trading strategy to the post-tax wealth if the investor does not trade.
By rearranging the second equation in the above definition, the post-tax wealth difference relative to autarky simplifies to
Theorem 2 No pre-tax arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage for every investor if the interest rate is positive.

Proof:
To establish the proof, we first show that ∆W (ω) ≥ 0 ⇔ (y ω − z ω ) ≥ p(y − z) with strict inequality for at least one state. Rearranging (3), we have
From the budget constraint,
Substituting this quantity, we have
Again, from the budget constraint
Substituting this quantity,
where
Multiplying each side of the above inequality by p ω and summing across states,
For the trading strategy to be pre-tax self-financing,
This implies that ω p ω ≥ 1 or the interest rate is non-positive for a pre-tax arbitrage opportunity to exist.
By ruling out wash sales, we arrive at the same restriction for post-tax no arbitrage as in the case of limited use of capital losses. By the interest rate being positive, realizing positive capital gains is dominated by deferral. The investor is unable to take advantage of the full use of losses to capture a local post-tax arbitrage opportunity since once he sells, he cannot re-invest in his original position because of the wash sale restriction.
As an immediate consequence of Theorems 1 and 2, the following corollary immediately follows when an investor faces the limited use of capital losses and wash sales are prohibited.
Corollary 1 No pre-tax arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage for all investors if the interest rate is positive when wash sales are prohibited and the use of capital losses is limited.
Static Arrow-Debreu Price Systems with a Taxable Bond
In this section we extend the Arrow-Debreu model to incorporate a taxable riskless bond allowing us to understand how the limited use of capital losses and the wash sale constraint influences the set of post-tax no arbitrage prices when securities pay both investment and capital gain income.
Our definition of investment income is income paid by securities that is subject to taxation at the investor's ordinary income tax rate. In the U.S. tax code, dividends and interest are viewed as investment income.
The bond in the price system is not subject to capital gain taxes, but its interest is taxed as ordinary income at the rate t I . Let r f denote the pre-tax riskless interest rate and let y B denote the (net) investment in the bond. We set the bond price equal to 1, so the face value of the bond is 1 + r f , and continue with the pure contingent claims economy.
Given that income from the bond's interest is the only form of investment income in the price system, taxes are only paid on interest payments when they are positive as consistent with the U.S. tax code. When the investor borrows using the bond, he cannot collect a tax rebate from his interest payments since he has no other investment income. Incorporating dividend income into the analysis is discussed in Section 3.3.
Adding the riskless bond into the price system leads to the following definition for pre-tax arbitrage.
Definition 8 There is pre-tax arbitrage if a trading strategy (y, y B ) exists such that
Since the bond is a redundant security, no pre-tax arbitrage requires that p ω > 0 for all ω and
Limited Use of Capital Losses
Following the previous case with no taxable bond, the budget constraint now reads
The post-tax wealth difference relative to autarky is
The definition takes account of the income tax on interest income. This tax is paid if the interest received is positive, but there is no rebate if y B < 0, i.e. money is borrowed.
Definition 9
There is post-tax arbitrage if there exists z, q ≥ z ≥ 0, y, and y B such that
Lemma 1 If there exists post-tax arbitrage, then there exists post-tax arbitrage with a "tight" strategy, i.e. one with p(y
Proof: This is particularly straightforward:
then the surplus should be used to buy the bond. 
Theorem 3 If t I ≥ τ then no-pre-tax arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage for every investor if
Substituting for p y from the budget constraint,
(1−τ ) < y B r. The right hand side is non-positive, so this inequality also holds in weak form for any state where
Multiplying by p ω and summing yields p(y − z)
Since ω p ω = 1/(1 + r f ), this implies ω p ω > 1, contradicting a positive interest rate.
Lemma 3 If there is no pre-tax arbitrage, there is no post-tax arbitrage with y
Since there is no pre-tax arbitrage, there exists a state with
Since t I ≥ τ and y B > 0,
For any state with
since y B > 0. Therefore this inequality holds for all ω. Multiplying by p ω and summing across
Wash Sales Prohibited and the Full Use of Capital Losses
When no taxable bond was present, prohibiting wash sales was sufficient to guarantee no pre-tax arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage. With the introduction of the taxable bond, additional restrictions are needed as we now show.
To isolate the effect of the wash sale constraint, assume investors face no restriction on the use of capital losses but face a wash sale restriction when trading Arrow-Debreu securities. For a particular tight trading strategy (y, z) with p ω < b ω , the number of state ω securities recognized as purchased or shorted by the taxing authority is y ω −max{min(y ω , z ω ), 0} and the number recognized as sold is z ω − max{min(y ω , z ω ), 0}. Note that the max operator accommodates for the investor simultaneously shorting (y ω < 0) and selling (z ω > 0) in a state. With the wash sale constraint, trading strategies that simultaneously sell and repurchase shares with a capital loss can be ignored since the net strategy of either just buying or selling shares is equivalent. Without loss of generality, we only consider wash sale constrained trading strategies that prohibit simultaneous trades of y ω > 0
Incorporating the bond, post-tax arbitrage is defined as follows.
Definition 10 A post-tax arbitrage exists if there is a wash-sale constrained tight trading strategy
With the existence of the taxable bond, the wash sale constraint alone is not adequate to rule out post-tax arbitrage for all possible trading strategies. Absence of post-tax arbitrage now requires an additional restriction on the bases of an investor's Arrow-Debreu security endowment.
Theorem 4
If r f > 0, t I ≥ τ , and an investor's portfolio satisfies
then no pre-tax arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage.
The proof of the theorem is immediate from the following lemmas. Substituting the budget constraint into (4) and rearranging, 
Proof:
From the previous lemma, we only need to consider trading strategies where y B > 0 and
Substituting the budget constraint into (4) and rearranging, consider a potential post-tax arbitrage opportunity:
Examining the budget constraint 0
where the last inequality follows from t I ≥ τ implying a contradiction.
To simplify proving Theorem 4, it is useful to only consider trading strategies that are not trivially dominated by other strategies. The following characterizes such trading strategies. 
In any state ω,
Lemma 7 For a trading strategy (y, z) that is not dominated in the sense of Lemma 6, arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage if r f > 0, t I ≥ τ , and
Proof: See appendix.
From Theorem 4, the introduction of the taxable bond allows for possible post-tax local arbitrage opportunities when the bases of endowed Arrow-Debreu securities are too high relative to their current prices. When equation (5) is violated, an investor is better off liquidating his positions in the securities with large embedded bases and investing the proceeds in the taxable bond. This is beneficial for large enough bases since the interest collected will dominate any possible capital gains collected by not trading. If an investor's security endowment is such that he has a capital loss in all securities, the restriction (5) simplifies to
Since τ ≤ t I ,
When the rate of interest taxation is higher than the rate of capital gain taxation, the security bases must be higher for a possible arbitrage to exist since a bond investment is taxed at a higher rate.
If in addition to ruling out wash-sales, we also only allow for the limited use of capital losses as in Section 3.1, we again only need a positive interest rate and t I ≥ τ to rule out post-tax arbitrage opportunities. The proof is immediate. 
Tax-Arbitrage with Redundant Securities
In contrast to the work of Schaefer (1982) and Dybvig and Ross (1986) , we did not need to impose any trading constraints on the securities to rule out post-tax arbitrage opportunities with washsales prohibited and the limited use of capital losses even though the bond is a redundant security in the price system. This feature is driven by the lack of tax rebates from interest expenses when shorting the bond. Given the bond's interest payments are potentially taxed higher than capital gains, an investor could capture a post-tax arbitrage opportunity if interest expenses lead to a tax rebate by shorting the bond. Here the arbitrage opportunity would be to simply short the bond and long a synthetic bond formed from the Arrow-Debreu securities. When interest is taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, the tax rebate from interest expenses is larger than any capital gain taxes generating the tax arbitrage.
If the Arrow-Debreu securities also generate investment income in the form of dividends, a post-tax arbitrage can be generated even when wash sales are precluded and capital loss usage is limited. This arbitrage is constructed by trading to convert taxable investment income into lower taxed capital gains. Table 3 By shorting the bond and investing the proceeds in the Arrow-Debreu securities, the investor can convert taxable income into lower taxed capital gains. The second column of the table labeled "Borrow Bonds Strategy" outlines this strategy. In this example, the investor borrows 0.08 units of the bond and uses the proceeds to buy an equal amount of each Arrow-Debreu security (0.2 extra units). By doing so, the taxable investment income in each state is now zero since the interest expense (−0.120) offsets the dividend paid (0.120). As compared to not trading, the net capital This post-tax arbitrage opportunity is not ruled out through either the wash sale constraint or limiting capital losses. Features of the U.S. tax code do exist however that rule out the desirability of such a strategy. When interest expenses are used to produce tax exempt income (dividend income in the example), the interest expense is no longer deductible. This immediately closes the ability to convert taxable income into lower taxed capital gains. 4
Single Period Binomial Stock and Bond Price Systems
Given the binomial stock and bond price system is the workhorse model in a variety of asset pricing applications, we develop the additional price and tax restrictions needed to guarantee no post-tax arbitrage in such a setting. Additionally, our results highlight that the no post-tax arbitrage restrictions needed are market structure dependent given we arrive at different restrictions than in the Arrow-Debreu setting. These differences are driven by securities now paying both dividend and capital gain income as well as the fact that capital gain taxes are paid from a portfolio-wide perspective.
Consider a one-period financial market with a riskless bond and a stock. The riskless bond pays interest at the rate of return r f each period. Interest paid by the bond is taxable at the rate t I .
Ownership of one unit of the bond entitles the owner to the post-tax cash flow of 1 + r f (1 − t I ) next period. For convenience, the after tax total return of the bond is defined R f 1 + r f (1 − t I ).
The stock follows a binomial process with initial price S. At the end of the period, the stock's ex-dividend price is S ω where ω ∈ {u, d} with u > d. The stock also pays a dividend at the end of the period of δ(ω)S ω where δ(ω) is the stock's dividend yield. Dividend income is taxed at the rate t D . We separately model the dividend and interest tax rate to accommodate the bond potentially being tax-free. The extension to the multinomial case is immediate. Realized capital gain income is taxed at the rate τ . 
Capital Losses Carried Forward
In this subsection, we explore the additional restrictions needed on a pre-tax no arbitrage price system such that the post-tax price system is also arbitrage free when realized capital losses can only be used to offset current realized capital gains. Unused capital losses can be carried forward to potentially offset future capital gains.
As in the Arrow-Debreu setting, we start from an initial endowment and ask if there exists a feasible trade that will make the investor better off in all future states. The investor initially has an endowment in bonds and stocks (q B , q) with a basis vector b and a carried forward capital loss from past trade of L(−1) ≤ 0.
A trading strategy (y B , y, z) is feasible if it satisfies the budget constraint given by S(y
Post-tax wealth from a feasible trade (y B , y, z), is given by
, 0} represents any accumulated capital losses from time t = 0 trade.
Definition 11 A pre-tax arbitrage occurs if there exist y, y B such that
S y + y B ≤ 0 and S(ω)(1 + δ(ω)) y
for all ω with strict inequality for some ω ∈ {u, d}.
In the binomial model, it is well-known that no pre-tax arbitrage is equivalent to d < 1+r f < u.
Again, we search for additional restrictions on the price system to also rule out post-tax arbitrage opportunities.
Definition 12 A post-tax arbitrage occurs if there exists a feasible trading strategy
for all ω with strict inequality for some ω where W NT (ω) is the post-tax wealth in state ω of not trading initially.
Lemma 8 If there exists post-tax arbitrage, then there exists post-tax arbitrage with a "tight strategy," i.e. one with S(y
, then the surplus should be used to buy the bond.
From the existence of a tight strategy, the bond holding can be substituted out of the post-tax wealth difference giving
We now present the additional restrictions we need on the price system to rule out post-tax arbitrage opportunities for any taxable investor with any endowment. As compared to the earlier Arrow-Debreu price system studied, we arrive at an analogous condition on the riskless interest rate, but also must restrict the highest possible return of the stock relative to the bond. The result is summarized by the following theorem.
, then no pre-tax arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage for every investor.
If the interest rate r f ≤ 0, then an investor with a large embedded gain has an incentive to realize the gain now instead of deferring. By doing so, the investor reduces the present value of his tax burden since the interest rate is negative. By restricting r f > 0, we rule out such a local post-tax arbitrage opportunity. The additional conditions on the price system keep the bond from dominating the stock's return from a post-tax perspective. Without the conditions, the investor faces an unbounded arbitrage opportunity. Note that these conditions are sufficient for any investor regardless of his current stock position and tax basis. The assumption that the stock price plus dividends can fall (d + δ(d) < 1) is not necessary to rule out post-tax arbitrage, but it greatly simplifies the analysis. The proof of the theorem follows immediately from the following two lemmas. 
Case 1:
and using the assumptions of the lemma. Case 2:
The post-tax wealth difference in the down state is
Equation (9) gives several cases to examine.
Case 2a: Both max operators zero.
Since both max operators are zero, an upper bound on
can be computed from the expression in the first max operator:
Substituting into the post-tax wealth difference gives
Case 2b: First max operator is positive, while the second max operator is zero.
The post-tax wealth difference ∆W (d) simplifies to
Case 2c: First max operator is zero, while the second max operator is positive.
Simplifying,
Case 2d: Both max operators are positive.
When both max operators are positive, ∆W (d) simplifies to
In all cases, we have
which is less than zero when
Rearranging, 
Case 1:
. Rearranging,
The post-tax wealth difference ∆W (u) simplifies to
Equation (12) gives several cases to check similar to Lemma 9. Examining all cases gives
z i , the first max operator simplifies to
When both max operators are positive, ∆W (u) = τ r f (1 − t I ) (
When the first max operator is positive and the second negative, ∆W (u) = 0.
When the first max operator is zero and the second is positive,
.
From the first max operator,
Wash Sales Prohibited with the Full Use of Capital Losses
In this section, we analyze how a wash sale constraint influences the additional conditions needed on the binomial price system to rule out post-tax arbitrage opportunities. As in the previous wash sale sections, we study the wash sale constraint in isolation -investors face no restriction on the use of capital losses. In particular, we impose a wash sale constraint on the sale of the stock. If the stock is sold with a capital loss and repurchased, the original sale is deemed to have not occurred. For a trading strategy (y, z), the actual total number of shares purchased or shorted is y − max min With the wash sale constraint in effect, trading strategies that simultaneously repurchase shares y > 0 and sell shares with a capital loss (z i > 0 where S < b i ) need not be considered, since the net strategy of either just purchasing shares or just selling shares is equivalent. To rule out post-tax arbitrage opportunities, we need to consider two types of trading strategies. The first is a trading strategy where the investor may simultaneously purchase new shares as well as sell shares with positive capital gains. The second is a trading strategy that just sells shares.
Theorem 6 No pre-tax arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage for an investor if
u + 1−t D 1−τ δ(u) > 1 + 1−t I 1−τ r f , t D ≥ τ , r f > 0, d + δ(d) < 1
, and his portfolio satisfies
The proof of this theorem is split into two cases for clarity.
If a trading strategy (y, z) is such that z i = 0 for all i where S < b i , then no pre-tax arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage.
Proof: The post-tax wealth difference is given by
Rearranging and using S −
which is less than zero for a self-financing trading strategy as was shown in Lemmas 9 and 10 for the conditions placed on the price system stated in the Lemma.
Lemma 12 Consider a trading strategy where y ≤ 0. No pre-tax arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage if
Proof: Given the investor is not buying, we need to examine state u to rule out any violation of post-tax arbitrage. The post-tax wealth difference in state u is given by
A sufficient condition for ∆W (u) < 0 is that for every z i ,
Rearranging, this implies
for all i.
In contrast to the Arrow-Debreu case with no wash sales allowed, it is possible that the stockbond price system admits a local post-tax arbitrage opportunity if the basis to price ratio is very high relative to the current stock price:
Given the extremely high basis, the investor would rather liquidate his stock position today and invest the proceeds in the bond. Since the "tax rebate" from selling today is very large, the investor would rather receive one period of interest on it rather than even hold the stock for one more period and then collecting the "tax rebate." Once we also impose the limited use of capital losses, this tax arbitrage is no longer profitable. The proof is immediate from Theorem 5. 
The Dynamic Setting in a Binomial Stock and Bond Price System
Given an important feature of realized capital gains taxation is how capital gains or losses are realized intertemporally, it is important to extend our no arbitrage analysis of the previous sections to a dynamic setting. Due to the burdensome notation involved with studying a dynamic Arrow-Debreu economy, we focus on extending the binomial stock-bond model to multiple periods. Specifically, the economy considered has two periods. The extension to n > 2 periods is straightforward.
The securities in the financial market are a single period riskless bond and a stock subject to realized capital gains taxes. The riskless bond pays interest at the rate of return r f (ω t ) from time t to t + 1 where ω t designates the current date-state. Interest paid by the bond is taxable at the rate t I . Ownership of one unit of the bond entitles the owner to the post-tax cash flow of 1 + r f (ω t )(1 − t I ) next period. For convenience, the post-tax total return of the bond is defined R f (ω t ) 1 + r f (ω t )(1 − t I ). The stock follows a binomial process with initial price S(0). At time t, the stock's price is S(t; ω t ) where ω t = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) is a path along the binomial tree. The rate of appreciation (depreciation) of the stock is u(ω t ) (d(ω t )). For convenience, the stock is assumed to pay no dividends, but incorporating dividends into the analysis is immediate.
As before, the investor has an initial endowment in the stock consisting of share positions q(0) (q 1 , . . . , q n ) with corresponding bases b (0) (b 1 , . . . , b n ). His initial position in the bond is q B (0). The vector z(ω t ) (z 1 , . . . , z n ) represents sales of the time t = 0 stock position. The scalar y(ω t ) represents new purchases of the stock, while z s (ω t ) designates the sale of stock originally purchased at time s < t. As before, y B (ω t ) denotes the net investment in the bond.
Capital Losses Carried Forward
As with the single period binomial setting, we first consider the setting where capital losses can only be used to offset current or future gains and the investor faces no wash sale restriction. In the dynamic setting, the budget constraints at time t = 0 and t = 1 are given by
where carried forward capital losses from past trades are L(−1) ≤ 0 and unused capital losses at
The post-tax wealth at time t = 2 is
where carried forward capital losses at time t = 1 are
Our definition of post-tax arbitrage is the multi-period extension of the earlier definition. The no-trade wealth evolution W NT (ω 2 ) is given by the trading strategy
Definition 13 Post-tax arbitrage exists if there is a self-financing trading strategy such that
for all binomial paths ω 2 with strict inequality for some ω 2 .
To rule out the existence of post-tax arbitrage opportunities, it is easiest to work with a tight trading strategy.
Lemma 13 If a post-tax arbitrage exists, then there exists post-tax arbitrage with a tight strategy, i.e. one with the budget constraints (15) and (16) satisfied with equality.
Proof: If the budget constraints are not satisfied with equality, then the surplus should be used to buy the bond.
pre-tax arbitrage opportunities implies no post-tax arbitrage opportunities for all investors.
Wash Sales Prohibited with the Full Use of Capital Losses
In this section we study the role of the wash sale constraint in determining post-tax arbitrage free prices in the dynamic binomial price system. As in the single period setting of Section 4.2, the wash sale constraint is studied in isolation -investors face no capital loss restrictions. When rebalancing a stock position at a particular date, the wash sale constraint restricts an investor from simultaneously selling shares at a capital loss and repurchasing shares. We assume the time between trading periods is long enough that the wash sale constraint binding in the previous period does not influence current period trade. To reduce the complexity of the arguments, we also assume that the pre-capital gain tax price system is one where the rate of appreciation (depreciation) for the stock is constant at u (d) and that u d = R f where R f 1 + r f (1 − t I ). Theorem 8 below still holds when these two additional assumptions are relaxed, but several additional cases to analyze result.
In the dynamic setting, the budget constraints for tight trading strategies at time t = 0 and t = 1 are given by
Substituting the budget constraints, the post-tax wealth at time t = 2 is
where due to the wash sale constraint y ( 
The proof of the theorem is established by the following two lemmas. 
Lemma 14
Proof: See the appendix.
With only wash sales prohibited, the taxis basis condition given by (21) is more complex than the one period setting. In (21), the first term in the min operator is the analog of the one period setting. The second term rules out post-tax arbitrage opportunities when the investor liquidates shares with a capital loss at t = 0 and purchases shares if the stock price increases at t = 1. 
Construction of Post-Tax State Prices
Once we have established that no post-tax arbitrage opportunities exist, post-tax state prices as in Ross (1987) can be constructed that are positive and price the aggregate post-tax wealth profile of an investor. We can also construct post-tax state prices that value marginal additions to an existing endowment. These aggregate and marginal state prices however are highly position dependent. 
These state prices capture that for the investor to replicate an arbitrarily small position in the claim, he will pay capital gain taxes in the up state only since he holds no existing securities with embedded capital gains.
If instead we consider an investor whose existing portfolio leads to a positive capital gain in the down state, his marginal valuation of the same post-tax payoff isp u c u +p d c d where his post-tax state-pricesp are computed from
These state prices now incorporate the capital loss in the down state -by replicating a marginal quantity of the claim, the investor will be able to use the capital loss in the down state from the replicating strategy to offset positive capital gain taxes from the rest of the portfolio. These different post-tax state prices across investors invoke different valuations for the same post-tax cash flow. However, this does not imply a post-tax arbitrage exists since the investors cannot directly trade in the post-tax claim.
Given post-tax state prices are position dependent, this makes using them to determine the conditions on the price system needed to rule out post-tax arbitrage opportunities rather difficult prompting our approach to determine these conditions directly. This position dependency also makes using these state price difficult for valuation. However, given the price systems we study are also free of pre-tax arbitrage, securities can still be valued with the pre-tax state prices.
Tax-Loss Selling with No Post-Tax Arbitrage Opportunities
When investors face no wash sale and capital loss use restrictions, it is optimal to immediately realize any capital loss in the portfolio to generate a "tax rebate" (see for example Constantinides (1983) ). After tax-loss selling, the investor can rebalance his portfolio using the tax rebate making him strictly better off. Once capital loss use is restricted or wash sales are prohibited, the desirability of tax-loss selling is significantly reduced.
Corollary 5
In either the Arrow-Debreu or the binomial setting,
If the use of capital losses is limited, the investor is indifferent between tax-loss selling today
or retaining the capital loss until it can be used to offset a capital gain.
If wash sales are restricted, it is only optimal to tax-loss sell when the embedded capital loss
is large enough to generate a post-tax arbitrage opportunity.
Portfolio Choice with Limited Capital Losses and No Wash Sales
Interestingly, our no post-tax arbitrage results only require us to restrict the full use of capital losses. Trading strategies which involve "shorting the box" are still feasible. In the context of the binomial price system, this trading strategy is defined as follows. When a shorting the box transaction is permitted, it is possible to sell assets with an embedded gain without actually realizing the gain. In the binomial setting, if the investor wants to sell shares with an embedded gain, he simply takes a position y < 0 rather than a sale position z i which would trigger a realized gain. Constantinides (1983) capitalized on this gain deferral using a shorting the box transaction to value the realized capital gain tax loss selling option. After the U.S. Tax Reform
Act of 1998 such a transaction was essentially prohibited.
In invests a larger fraction of his wealth in equity than even investor NT who is not taxed. This desire to purchase more equity is driven by the fact that the post-tax return of the stock is skewed upward given the tax rebate with a capital loss. If the stock price falls, investor FUL will have a capital loss in his originally position. By being able to fully use this capital loss, the post-tax depreciation of the stock price is less severe than when the capital loss use is limited. This leads to the overall desire for equity to be skewed upward in the entire binomial tree. In contrast, investor LUL can only use his realized losses to offset current or future capital gains. His optimal net equity positions are considerably lower than investor FUL. Only in state UU does his equity position approach that of the FUL investor. Since the stock market has not fallen, no capital losses skew the portfolio choice of investor FUL. 44%  25%  20%  22%  12%  10%  11%  6%  U  40%  45%  33%  20%  22%  17%  10%  11%  9%  D  40%  43%  27%  20%  22%  14%  10%  11%  7%  UU  40%  45%  41%  20%  23%  23%  10%  12%  12%  UD  40%  44%  11%  20%  22%  5%  10%  11%  3%  DU  40%  45%  12%  20%  23%  8%  10%  11%  4%  DD  40%  43%  39%  20%  22%  18%  10%  11%  9% 7 Summary
In this paper, we re-examined the no arbitrage characterization of asset prices in the presence of capital gain and investment taxes. When the use of capital losses is restricted as consistent with the U.S. tax code, the lack of pre-tax arbitrage implies the lack of post-tax arbitrage under mild additional restrictions on price systems and tax rates. These restrictions are summarized in Table   5 . Prohibiting wash sales alone is not sufficient to rule out local post-tax arbitrages. We also demonstrate that the use of capital losses has strong implications for portfolio choice. When the full use of capital losses is disallowed, investors tend to optimally hold significantly smaller equity positions. The largest equation (A4) can be for a givenz is whenȳ is minimized. To still possibly induce a post-tax arbitrage opportunity,ȳ is bounded from below by setting (A3) equal to zero implyinḡ
where the denominator is positive when r f > 0 since
Substituting the right-side of (A5) into (A4) forȳ and simplifying implies the following bound on the sum of the Arrow-Debreu security bases for equation (A4) to be negative whenz > 0:
When (A4) is negative, it also implies that there exists a state ω where ∆W (ω) < 0 under the original trading strategy; hence, equation (A6) is sufficient to rule out post-tax arbitrage opportunities for a given trading strategy (y, z).
Given z ω > 0 only if b ω > p ω , zω>0 b ω ≤ bω>pω b ω and zω>0 p ω ≤ bω>pω p ω . Also, y ω < 0 and z ω = 0 implies b ω ≤ p ω , so {yω<0, zω=0} p ω ≤ bω≤pω p ω . Using these inequalities, a sufficient condition for (A6) to be true is
Substituting the definition of R f and rearranging,
Proof of Theorem 7:
To show no pre-tax arbitrage opportunities implies no post-tax arbitrage opportunities, we take as given an arbitrary feasible trading strategy. With this strategy, we show that it does not lead to a post-tax arbitrage opportunity with the price system restrictions given in the theorem. Substituting the bond positions (15) and (16) 
The first two lines of (A7) give the net wealth with no capital gain taxes as compared to autarky. The remaining terms capture the effect of realized capital gain taxation.
From the existence of no pre-tax arbitrage opportunities, a trading strategy does not exist that makes the investor strictly better off as compared to no trade from a pre-tax perspective. If 
We now look for a bound on the last term in (A9). Since the last three max operators in (A7) are zero, capital losses are potentially carried forward each period implying The last two terms in the above expression are negative given all the max operators are positive, establishing (A8). Case 3: The case when some of the max operators are positive and some zero follows from Cases 1 and 2 in a straightforward manner. Having now established (A8) for the post-tax wealth difference relative to autarky, we know show that under the additional price restrictions stated in the Theorem, no pre-tax arbitrage implies no post-tax arbitrage.
Consider a trading strategy that potentially could lead to a post-tax arbitrage. Assume this trading strategy leads to a net sale of stock at time t = 0, y(0) − 1 z(0) < 0. If the up state is realized from t = 0 to t = 1, then the investor's pre-tax wealth has fallen relative to not trading since he sold stock at t = 0. We need to show that the investor's post-tax wealth has also fallen. If so, post-tax arbitrage is precluded. The argument is symmetric when the investor's trading strategy leads to net purchasing at time t = 0, y(0) − 1 z(0) ≥ 0 and the down state is realized from t = 0 to t = 1. Assume at time t = 1 the investor is a net seller of shares again -y(u) − z 0 (u) − 1 z(u) ≤ 0. We now verify that ∆W (u, u) < 0 implying no post-tax arbitrage for such a trading strategy. Simplifying the above expression when ω 2 = u, we have
Under the assumption that u > 1 +
Examining u 2 (1 − τ ) − R f (0)R f (u) + τ and using the same restriction on u, we have
since R f (0)R f (u) − R f (0) − R f (u) + 1 is bounded below by 1 and an increasing function in both R f (0) and R f (u). This implies ∆W (u, u) < 0. Assume that at time t = 1 the investor is a net buyer of shares y(u) − z 0 (u) − 1 z(u) > 0 where the pre-tax payoff relative to autarky in state ω 2 = (u, d) is negative. We now attempt to show that ∆W (u, d) < 0 or ∆W (u, u) < 0. The case when the pre-tax payoff relative to autarky is negative instead in state ω 2 = (u, u) follows directly. From the existence of no pre-tax arbitrage, the pre-tax payoff cannot be positive in both (u, d) and (u, u) .
For the pre-tax payoff relative to autarky in state ω 2 = (u, d) to be negative,
The post-tax payoff in state (u, d) relative to autarky is
